Dishonesty and falsified records

A false timesheet entry, an inflated expense claim, a maintenance checklist signed off before the work was done — the record being wrong is usually easy to prove. Whether the person who made it was dishonest is a different, much harder question, and getting that distinction right decides most of these cases.

What you’ll be able to do

• Separate “the record was wrong” from “they knew it was wrong when they made it” — and know which one you actually have to prove.
• Apply the Briginshaw standard with the weight a dishonesty finding actually carries for someone’s reputation and future employability.
• Recognise the patterns the Commission uses to tell a genuine lie from a genuine mistake, and know when lying about the conduct can become its own separate reason.

The fact and the state of mind are two different questions

Module 5 flagged the trap: an allegation framed as “knowingly” lodging false reports failed because “knowingly” was never proved, even though the reports themselves were wrong. This module is about that same trap, specifically for falsified business records — timesheets, expense claims, maintenance and safety checklists, sales records, records of customer interactions, qualifications on a resume.

An employer who wants to dismiss someone for dishonesty is not just proving the record was inaccurate. It has to prove the person knew what they recorded was false — or was reckless as to its truth — at the time they recorded it. A genuine mistake, a misunderstanding of what was actually required, or plain carelessness is not dishonesty, however wrong the record turned out to be.

Petrie v Amazon shows what that looks like when the employer can’t clear that bar. Mr Petrie signed off a preventative maintenance work order as complete after doing only a visual check, having previously been told by an earlier supervisor that this was an acceptable practice. Amazon treated this as “falsification of a document or fraud and an act of dishonesty.” The Commission disagreed: “This was his honest, but mistaken understanding given, I find, that this was a practice that he had been previously told to adopt by his previous supervisor” [2026] FWC 2346 at [112]. Even though the work order itself was literally inaccurate, “I do not consider that Mr Petrie was dishonest” or that he falsified the document [2026] FWC 2346 at [114]. Overall, the Commission was not satisfied the respondent had a valid reason to dismiss him at all [2026] FWC 2346 at [135], and ordered that he be reinstated [2026] FWC 2346 at [192].

Tiavo v Axiom Australia shows the other side of the same question — where the Commission was satisfied the line into dishonesty had actually been crossed. More on that below.

Briginshaw: why the standard matters more here

Dishonesty is exactly the kind of allegation Briginshaw was written for. A finding that someone lied, not just that they made an error, carries its own reputational weight — it follows a person into their next job search in a way “you missed a KPI” never will.

Tiavo applies the standard directly to a dishonesty allegation about falsified timesheets: “the nature of the relevant issue necessarily affects the ‘process by which reasonable satisfaction is attained’ and such satisfaction ‘should not be produced by inexact proofs, indefinite testimony, or indirect inferences’” [2020] FWC 4819 at [65]. Quoting Greyhound Racing Authority, the Commission put the practical translation this way: the level of satisfaction needed must be “commensurate with the gravity of the charge” [2020] FWC 4819 at [66]. The applicant himself ran this argument, submitting that “in accordance with the principles articulated in Briginshaw an allegation of dishonesty is a grave matter with serious consequences” and the Commission ought be cautious before finding him dishonest [2020] FWC 4819 at [74].

The Commission accepted the standard but still found dishonesty proved on these facts — which is the point. Briginshaw doesn’t mean the Commission can never find dishonesty; it means the finding has to be properly earned on the evidence, not assumed from a wrong number on a form.

Patterns the Commission looks for

A pattern beats a one-off

A single discrepancy is usually at least as consistent with a mistake as with a lie. A pattern — especially one that tracks a clear benefit to the employee — is much harder to explain away.

In Goburdhun v Endeavour Group (BWS), a store manager manually altered his clock-out time to 5:30pm on eleven consecutive days, when CCTV showed he had actually left the store up to an hour and a half earlier each time. The Commission was satisfied he had deliberately entered incorrect clock-out times [2021] FWC 3224 at [116] and had repeatedly falsified them [2021] FWC 3224 at [117]. Critically, the Commission drew the pattern-versus-isolated-incident distinction explicitly: it might have accepted a one-off unapproved early start for operational reasons, “[b]ut in this instance, on his own evidence, he needed to start early for eleven days in a row” and then chose to finish early on all of them too [2021] FWC 3224 at [132]. He also had a clear, stated motive — to collect his wife from work — which made the pattern make sense as a choice rather than an accident. The Commission found he “chose to deceive his employer” and actively concealed his early departures [2021] FWC 3224 at [138], and that falsifying his clock-out times on multiple occasions was a valid reason for dismissal [2021] FWC 3224 at [119]. The dismissal was neither harsh, unjust nor unreasonable [2021] FWC 3224 at [141].

Raitt v G-Force Recruitment shows the same pattern-logic from a different angle: independent corroboration from people who had no reason to coordinate a story. A disability support team leader “resulted” (marked as completed) appointments with participants she had not actually attended. The employer’s dismissal letter noted she had only 39 case entries for the relevant period against a colleague’s 196 [2023] FWC 946 at [9] — a comparator that turns “maybe she was just slower” into “something doesn’t add up.” The Commission accepted that several participants had independently contacted the company to say their scheduled appointments with her had not actually happened [2023] FWC 946 at [10], and found she had represented by her own electronic records that she had met with participants when she had not [2023] FWC 946 at [13]. The company had good and substantiated reasons to dismiss her [2023] FWC 946 at [21].

A shifting explanation undermines an “honest mistake” defence

An account that stays the same each time it’s tested is doing real work for the person giving it. An account that changes — “someone must have altered the record,” then “I don’t recall,” then “it was too far back” — works against them.

Back in Tiavo, when confronted under cross-examination with a discrepancy between his claimed hours and the sign-in sheet, the applicant initially blamed someone else for altering the record, then progressively retreated to “I don’t remember,” “I don’t recall,” and “I can’t recall that day.” He had also received a specific verbal warning not to falsify his time entries before the final incident. The Commission found it “implausible that the further incorrect entry on 10 February 2020 was an innocent or honest mistake”, noting his evidence “was evasive, unresponsive and exhibited a high degree of forgetfulness. It was simply not credible” [2020] FWC 4819 at [75]. Having applied Briginshaw properly, the Commission was not satisfied the dismissal was unfair [2020] FWC 4819 at [114].

Lainas v AMSPEC Australia shows a milder version of the same thing. Confronted with a timesheet claim inconsistent with the company’s own entry and exit records, the applicant offered a shifting mix of excuses — “maybe he was sick,” and that this was, in his own words, “maybe” an honest way of dealing with things [2024] FWC 311 at [47]. The Commission found he had incorrectly submitted a timesheet and claimed for hours he did not work, and that this was a further valid reason for dismissal [2024] FWC 311 at [48]. That finding on the timesheet did not decide the whole case, though — the Commission went on to find the dismissal was still, overall, harsh, unjust or unreasonable because of separate procedural failures by the employer [2024] FWC 311 at [81]. A proven dishonesty finding on one ground doesn’t automatically carry the rest of the case.

You don’t always need to prove the lie

Sometimes the inaccuracy in the record is enough on its own, without the employer having to resolve whether it was deliberate. In Stark v Charter Mercantile Agency, a call-centre employee provided inaccurate timesheets. The Commission didn’t need to work out “whether this was a deliberately deceitful act… or whether she genuinely believed that… the time sheets reflected the hours that she worked” [2021] FWC 6682 at [95] — in a workplace handling highly sensitive, confidential information and relying heavily on trust, the inaccuracy itself was enough to found a valid reason. Despite a procedural fairness failure, the dismissal was, on balance, not harsh, unjust or unreasonable [2021] FWC 6682 at [104].

The adviser’s lesson here runs the other way from the rest of this module: don’t reach for the word “dishonest” if you don’t actually need it. If an inaccurate record is a valid reason on its own in this workplace, a dishonesty label just adds a harder thing to prove for no extra benefit.

Beyond the day-to-day record: resumes and qualifications

The same fact/intent split applies to a misrepresented qualification, not just a day-to-day record. In an extension-of-time decision, Spottiswood v Brand Collective Australia, the Commission found the applicant had used the letters “CA” after his qualification on his resume specifically “to give a false impression he was a member of CA ANZ” when his membership had in fact been cancelled [2024] FWC 1837 at [32], and found that he did misrepresent his membership [2024] FWC 1837 at [33]. The Commission observed that, on that basis, “the merits of the case are not strong” [2024] FWC 1837 at [36].

That comment matters, but it needs to be read for what it actually is. The application itself was dismissed for want of an extension of time, not on a final hearing of the merits — so this isn’t a concluded valid-reason finding, it’s a preliminary view formed while deciding whether to let the case proceed at all. Treat it as useful evidence of how a resume misrepresentation is likely to be assessed, not as a fully tested outcome.

A lie told about the conduct can be its own valid reason

Everything so far has been about the underlying record. But lying to the employer about the record — or about the conduct generally — during the investigation can be a separate ground in its own right, distinct from whatever the original conduct was.

Bowen v Queensland Rail Transit Authority discusses this, by way of a Full Bench decision in Newton v Toll Transport which in turn draws on Streeter v Telstra Corporation Limited. In Streeter, an employee had engaged in consensual sexual activity with a colleague at a work-related social function, within view of other colleagues. When interviewed, she initially denied it and then refused to answer questions. At first instance it was found the underlying conduct, while connected to employment, wasn’t serious enough to be a valid reason — but “Telstra also relied on Ms Streeter’s lies about engaging in sexual activity during its investigation as a separate valid reason for her dismissal” [2026] FWC 898 at [144]. On appeal, the majority held the member at first instance had erred: “there was a valid reason for Ms Streeter’s dismissal due to her dishonesty in her interviews with Telstra management” [2026] FWC 898 at [144].

The lesson for advisers: if an employee lies to you during an investigation — about the underlying conduct, or about something else entirely — that lie can stand as its own, additional allegation. Put it to them separately and in its own terms, rather than folding it silently into the original allegation.

Dishonesty discovered after the dismissal

Sometimes evidence of dishonesty only surfaces after someone has already been dismissed for an unrelated reason. The general principle, as a Commission member summarised it while dealing with a separate evidentiary dispute, is that “after-acquired knowledge/evidence improves an employer’s case in relation to establishing a valid reason for dismissal” [2021] FWC 6394 at [31], drawing on the Full Bench in APS Group (Placements) Pty Ltd v O’Loughlin — but such evidence can weaken, not strengthen, the employer’s position on procedural fairness, because the employee was never given a chance to respond to it before the decision was made.

In practice: if you discover after the fact that a dismissed employee had also been falsifying records, you can usually still rely on it to support that a valid reason existed. What you can’t do is pretend it was part of a fair process at the time — it wasn’t, and s.387(b) and (c) will reflect that.

How dishonesty allegations fail

Adviser checklist

Practice scenario: the quality sign-off

Decisions cited

Check each paragraph reference against the published decision on the FWC website before relying on it. Newton v Toll Transport Pty Ltd [2021] FWCFB 3457, Streeter v Telstra Corporation Limited [2008] AIRCFB 15 and APS Group (Placements) Pty Ltd v O’Loughlin [2011] FWAFB 5230 are each cited as quoted within a later decision and are not independently in this corpus — check each quote against its original. The row for Spottiswood v Brand Collective Australia is marked “partial”: its resume-misrepresentation finding was made in the course of an extension-of-time decision, not a final merits hearing. The row for Lainas v AMSPEC Australia is also marked “partial”: the specific timesheet finding and the overall unfair-dismissal outcome are confirmed, but the decision’s other grounds were not independently re-verified paragraph by paragraph.