ER Practice Guide Conduct & performance
Tier 4: Running a matter · Module 18

Stand-down and suspension

Provision FWA s.524Version 0.1.0Last updated 2026-11-12T14:39:11+08:00Reading time 12 min
Training material only — not legal advice. It is an educational guide to Australian employment-law concepts and selected authorities, not a substitute for checking the current legislation, applicable industrial instruments, workplace policies, evidence or case-specific legal advice.

“Stand down” and “suspend” are not interchangeable. One is a narrow statutory power to stop paying for work that genuinely doesn’t exist. The other needs a basis of its own, and getting that basis wrong can turn a routine investigation into a repudiation of the contract.

What you’ll be able to do

Statutory stand down: s.524

Section 524 lets an employer stand down an employee without pay during a period in which the employee cannot usefully be employed because of one of three specific causes:

The words of the section

Reproduced in [2022] FWC 1774 at [6].

  1. Industrial action (other than industrial action organised or engaged in by the employer).
  2. A breakdown of machinery or equipment, if the employer cannot reasonably be held responsible for the breakdown.
  3. A stoppage of work for any cause for which the employer cannot reasonably be held responsible.

This is not a general “we have no work for you” power. It doesn’t cover a quiet trading period, a lost contract, or a manager deciding someone is surplus to requirements for the week. It only applies where the employee cannot usefully be employed, and that inability has to be caused by one of the three things above.

A Full Bench put the limiting principle squarely: s.524 “concerns circumstances in which there is an absence of work to be done, rather than a circumstance in which there is work to be done but the employee is not willing to perform it” [2025] FWCFB 274 at [52]. The premise of the whole section is that the employee is ready and willing to work and there’s genuinely nothing for them to do.

The two-step test

The Commission applies a two-step test to decide whether a stand down is authorised:

  1. Can the employee be usefully employed during the stand-down period? If there’s useful work available — anywhere in the business, not just in the employee’s usual role — s.524 doesn’t apply and no further inquiry is needed.
  2. If not, is that because of one of the three causes in s.524(1)? Where the cause relied on is a stoppage of work, the employer additionally has to show there was an actual stoppage, and that it can’t reasonably be held responsible for it [2024] FWC 3306 at [149].

In APESMA v Wollongong Resources, a coal mine was stood down after a government regulator issued a Prohibition Notice stopping coal production outright. The Commission found there was a genuine stoppage of work, no useful work available, and — critically — that the employer had engaged independent experts, cooperated with the regulator, and taken every reasonable step to lift the notice. That combination meant it could not reasonably be held responsible for the stoppage, and the stand down was lawful [2024] FWC 3306 at [149]. Contrast that with a stoppage the employer caused or dragged its feet on fixing — the same test would likely go the other way.

Industrial action is a cause, not a label

The industrial-action limb catches genuine attention: it’s tempting to assume that if an employee is engaged in protected industrial action and isn’t being paid, s.524(1)(a) must apply. It doesn’t automatically. The cause has to be that the industrial action means there’s no useful work at all — not that the employee has declined to do a particular task as part of a work ban while other useful work exists. A Full Bench corrected exactly this error on appeal, where a Commissioner had treated an employee’s refusal (as protected industrial action) to accept redeployment to another ward as itself satisfying s.524(1)(a), even though there was useful work available on that other ward [2025] FWCFB 274 at [53].

Suspension pending a disciplinary investigation

Suspension is a different tool entirely, and it is not a standalone statutory right. There is no equivalent of s.524 that lets an employer suspend an employee — paid or unpaid — simply because it wants to investigate an allegation. The power to suspend has to come from somewhere: an express term of the contract of employment, an award, an enterprise agreement, or some other statutory source.

Where that basis exists and is followed, suspension pending investigation is routine and low-risk. In Kerig v Victoria University, the applicable enterprise agreement set out a clear two-step clause: first, whether the relevant officer considered the allegations serious enough to warrant the employee not being at work [2020] FWC 1461 at [63]; second, whether the resulting suspension should be with or without pay. Because the University followed that clause, the Commission found it had proper grounds to commence the misconduct process and to suspend the employee without pay while it did so [2020] FWC 1461 at [146].

Where there is no such basis, unpaid suspension is exposed. A Federal Court decision squarely on this point has been quoted, in a litigant’s own correspondence, for the proposition that “at common law, an employer has no right to suspend an employee without pay” [2022] FWC 1530 at [18]. That authority is not independently verified against its own text in this pass — see the note under Decisions cited — but the underlying point is consistent with everything else in this module: withholding pay needs a source of authority, and “we’re investigating” isn’t one by itself.

Paid suspension is a different risk category. If an employee keeps being paid while an investigation runs, the financial harm that drives most disputes about stand down and suspension simply doesn’t arise, and there’s rarely an incentive to litigate the suspension decision itself (as opposed to what the investigation ultimately finds). Unpaid suspension, by contrast, puts the employer squarely in the position of withholding money owed under the contract — and if there’s no clause, award term or statute that allows that, the employer is at serious risk of repudiating the contract.

Withholding pay without a basis is repudiation risk, not a free option

The clearest illustration in this corpus of what happens when an employer withholds work and pay with no basis in either the contract or s.524 is Poulter v JA Concreting — not framed as a disciplinary suspension, but the underlying principle is identical. The applicant’s own submission captured it directly: “an employer does not have the right to stand an employee down without pay at common-law” [2025] FWC 1441 at [11]. The Commission agreed there was no evidence any of the s.524(1) causes existed [2025] FWC 1441 at [25], and found that withholding work and pay without authority amounted to a repudiation of the contract which the employee had accepted — meaning the employment was terminated at the employer’s initiative [2025] FWC 1441 at [29]. The same reasoning applies whether the employer calls it a “stand down” or a “suspension”: the label doesn’t matter, the authority does.

What the Commission looks for

How it goes wrong

Employer’s position failed

No basis, no pay, no defence

Work and pay were withheld with nothing in the contract and none of the s.524 causes present. The Commission treated this as a repudiation the employee had accepted. [2025] FWC 1441 at [25]-[26]

Before you stop paying someone, identify the specific source of authority. If you can’t point to a clause or a s.524(1) cause, don’t do it.

Reasoning overturned on appeal

A work ban isn’t automatically “no useful work”

A Commissioner accepted that an employee’s refusal of redeployment, as protected industrial action, meant she couldn’t be usefully employed “because of” industrial action — even though there was useful work available. The Full Bench held this conflated unwillingness to perform available work with a genuine absence of work. [2025] FWCFB 274 at [52]-[53]

“The employee won’t do this task” and “there is no task for the employee to do” are different findings. Only the second supports s.524(1)(a).

Wrong tool, wrong label

A vaccination direction is not a stand down

A union argued its member had been unlawfully stood down under s.524 when his employer stopped paying him for not complying with a vaccination requirement. The Commission found the employer never purported to rely on s.524 at all — the real dispute was about the lawfulness of a workplace direction, a different legal question with a different pathway. [2022] FWC 1774 at [31]-[32]

Work out which legal question you’re actually asking before you reach for s.526. “Not being paid” isn’t the same as “stood down”.

Challenge failed — the basis was there

An express clause did the work

An employee argued his unpaid suspension pending a misconduct investigation was invalid. The enterprise agreement had its own two-step suspension clause, the employer followed it, and the challenge failed. [2020] FWC 1461 at [146]

This is what a defensible unpaid suspension looks like: a specific clause, properly engaged, properly followed. Build that paper trail before you act, not after.

Adviser checklist

0 of 10
  • Which tool is this?
  • If it's a s.524 stand down
  • If it's a suspension
  • Before withholding pay

Practice scenario: the warehouse and the “stood down” email

Fictional scenario. Write your answers, then reveal the model answer.

Fictional scenario. Birchgate Logistics runs a regional distribution warehouse. Two things happen on the same Monday.

Priya operates the warehouse’s only reach forklift. The forklift’s hydraulic mast fails mid-shift. Birchgate’s maintenance contractor diagnoses a cracked hydraulic cylinder and says a replacement part is three days away. There is no other forklift on site and no other role Priya is qualified or available to perform that day. The operations manager sends Priya home and marks her “stood down under s.524, unpaid” for the three days.

Dion works in the same warehouse as a picker. A supervisor reports that stock is going missing from Dion’s aisle. The operations manager emails Dion: “You’re stood down, effective immediately, unpaid, while we investigate.” Dion’s contract is silent on suspension. The modern award covering the site has no suspension clause either. There is picking and packing work available elsewhere in the warehouse that Dion could do.

Mon 9:10amForklift mast failure reportedMon 10:05amContractor: replacement part 3 days awayMon 11:40amPriya sent home, marked “s.524 stand down”Mon 2:15pmStock discrepancy reported in Dion’s aisleMon 3:00pmDion emailed: “stood down… while we investigate”

Decisions cited

Check each paragraph reference against the published decision before relying on it. Avenia v Railway & Transport Health Fund Ltd [2017] FCA 859 is a Federal Court decision squarely on suspension pending investigation, but its own text could not be reconstructed from the chunk snapshot in this pass — it is quoted only as reproduced in a litigant’s letter in another decision, and needs checking against the original judgment. Rows marked “partial” confirm only the specific proposition pinpointed, not every finding in that decision.

DecisionOutcome (confirmed from the text)
[2025] FWCFB 274
ANMF v St Vincent's Private Hospitals (Full Bench)
On appeal, the Full Bench held the Commissioner erred: an employee's refusal of available redeployment work, made as protected industrial action, is not the same as having no useful work 'because of' industrial action under s.524(1)(a) — s.524 concerns an absence of work, not an employee's unwillingness to perform available work. The stand down was not authorised by s.524(1)(a). On redetermination, the Full Bench still declined to order payment on fairness grounds under s.526(4), for different reasons than the Commissioner gave. Permission to appeal granted; appeal dismissed. [53]
[2025] FWC 1441
Poulter v JA Concreting
partialThis is a jurisdictional decision only, on whether Mr Poulter was 'dismissed' within s.386(1)(a) — the underlying unfair dismissal merits were not decided here. The Commission found JA Concreting's withholding of work and pay was authorised neither by Mr Poulter's contract of employment nor by s.524 (none of the s.524(1) causes were shown), so it was not a lawful stand down. By filing his unfair dismissal application, Mr Poulter accepted this repudiation, and his employment was found to have been terminated at his employer's initiative under s.386(1)(a). The objection to the application was dismissed. [25]
[2024] FWC 3306
APESMA v Wollongong Resources
The Commission found the mine's month-long stand down was authorised under s.524(1)(c): there was a genuine stoppage of work caused by a regulator's Prohibition Notice, the employees could not be usefully employed, and Wollongong Resources had taken reasonable steps in response such that it could not reasonably be held responsible for the stoppage. Dispute application dismissed. [149]
[2022] FWC 1774
CFMMEU v British Concrete Pty Ltd
The Commission found British Concrete never stood Mr Salha down, nor purported to, under s.524 — his absence from work stemmed from his non-compliance with a vaccination direction, not from any of the s.524(1) causes — so the Union had no standing to bring a s.526 dispute on his behalf. Application dismissed. [32]
[2022] FWC 1530
James v Veolia Environmental Services
partialCited here only for a letter reproduced in the decision, in which the applicant's representative quoted Avenia v Railway & Transport Health Fund Ltd [2017] FCA 859 at [154] on the common law position on suspension without pay. This decision's own finding concerned an unrelated vaccination-mandate dismissal and is not relied on here — not asserted as this decision's holding. [18]
[2020] FWC 1461
Kerig v Victoria University
In a s.739 dispute under the University's enterprise agreement, the Commission found the University had grounds, under the agreement's own two-step suspension clause (first, whether the misconduct allegation was serious enough to warrant the employee not being at work; second, whether that suspension should be paid or unpaid), to commence serious misconduct proceedings and to suspend Mr Kerig without pay while it did so, and had complied with the agreement's procedure. [146]
Older authorities quoted, not independently located in the corpus:
  • Avenia v Railway & Transport Health Fund Ltd [2017] FCA 859 — quoted in [2022] FWC 1530 at [18]. Check against the original before relying on it.
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